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The article is a case study of the Koryo saram, the ethnic Koreans living in the Central Asian 
republic of Kyrgyzstan, to reflect on how notions of diasporas, community and identity have 
changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It contends that the Koryo saram are best 
understood through the lenses of diasporic conditions rather than as bounded communities as 
such an approach allows for greater recognition of heterogeneity within such communities. 
While many Koryo saram continue to claim some form of Korean-ness, how they related to 
issues of homeland-orientation and boundary maintenance evidences internal variation and 
growing in-betweenness. The community’s hybridity (“hyphenization”) and liminality 
(“identity through difference”) stand out when examining generational differences and are 
especially evident among the local Korean youth.  
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Deported by Stalin in 1937 and later widely regarded as “the model Soviet people” owing to 
their assimilation and integration in Russified Soviet society, the Soviet/post-Soviet Koreans 
have shown – over generations and space, through forcible and voluntary migration – 
remarkable skills of adaptation and survival to new political and cultural environments. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union engendered yet another experience of dislocation and mobility, 
this time of borders between peoples, with the establishment of new republics where before 
there had been one single Soviet state and homeland.  
This article examines the case of the Koryo saram,1 and specifically the ethnic Koreans 
living in Bishkek, capital city of Kyrgyzstan, to reflect on how notions of diasporas and identity 
have changed since the Soviet collapse. While the local Koreans’ path to social integration and 
the process of assimilation have been well covered in the literature,2 and increasingly about 
their distinctiveness vis-à-vis the Koreans of the peninsula,3 we still know very little about their 
condition of in-betweenness, or liminality and particularly the considerable heterogeneity 
within the community.  
The article pursues two aims. First, it seeks to broaden the analysis of Korean diasporas 
beyond the more common focus on Koreans in the West, 4  China,5  and Japan. 6  At about 
500,000 (table 1) the post-Soviet Koreans represent the world’s fifth-largest Korean diaspora. 
In the post-Soviet context, what makes the experience of the Koryo saram noteworthy is that, 
as Marco Buttino notes, they show how “a deported minority ingeniously adapted to the new 




in the new society.”7 The Koryo saram literature has primarily focused on Koreans living in 
Russia,8 Kazakhstan,9 and Uzbekistan,10 or the whole Central Asian region,11 as these are the 
territories of greater Korean settlement (table 1; map 1).  
 





Source: By Pline - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=87978519  (Creative Commons) 
 
Some attention has been paid to the aims and conduct of Korea’s foreign policy towards the 
Central Asian region, including the Koryo saram there, although the focus has primarily been 
on the outside-in (from Seoul towards the region) rather than on the local Korean communities 
themselves.12   
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In the pages that follow, I zoom in on one of the lesser known cases from the post-Soviet space, 
namely that of the Koreans of Kyrgyzstan,13 in order to broaden the empirical scope of the 
Koryo saram scholarship. The article thus seeks to move the discussion beyond the important, 
but by now well-covered issues in the literature, such as the initial migration of the Koreans to 
Russian territory, 14  and their deportation 15  in favour of a greater acknowledgement and 




Overall, in this article I take issue with recent trends in the scholarship that seek to 
establish whether the Koryo saram are “still” Korean or constitute a new, “separate”, Korean 
nation. Questioning whether the Koryo sarams are “still” Korean or whether their 
distinctiveness makes them substantially different from the Koreans of the peninsula has gained 
some traction in the literature,17 which makes this a relevant issue to engage with. At the same 
time such an approach (are the Koryo saram still Korean?) perpetuates assumptions of an idea 
of the Korean nation as primordialist, essentialist, and fundamentally static.  
To explore these issues, I draw on insights from constructivist and more critical 
approaches to the study of identities and diasporas. The work of Rogers Brubaker 18  is 
especially useful in that it questions assumptions of groupism and groupness still dominating 
the study of ethnicity and diasporas. Furthermore, the work of James Clifford19 and Floya 
Anthias20 appears similarly relevant in shifting the focus away from the relationship between 
the diaspora and the homeland (and particularly the latter), and towards the condition of the 






Map 2 about here 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kyrgyz_administrative.svg 






Methodologically I draw on various rounds of field research conducted in Kyrgyzstan 
over two decades, most recently in the capital city of Bishkek in 2018 and 2019 (map 2). I 
consulted archival sources including documents of the NKVD (Narodnyi Kommissariat 
Vnutrennikh Del, the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) in the 1930s and 1940s, 
correspondence between Soviet authorities at the time, and Soviet census data (1926, 1939, 
1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989) and publications of the local Korean cultural centre, such as the 
periodical ильчи/일치 published primarily in Russian with a handful of pages in Korean. In 
addition, I conducted several semi-structured interviews, in Russian or English, with local 
Koryo saram. Although the sample was not representative and the findings are more 
exploratory than conclusive, they speak to the usefulness of single-country case studies.21 
Although my concern here is to contribute to unpacking notions of groupness in diasporas 
common in the comparative study of politics and sociology, the article shares with comparative 
area studies,22 and the area studies sensibilities of much of the Koryo saram scholarship an 
effort to “understand politics in a local context.”23 
In telling the story of multiple mobilities, contingency and adaptation, the article 
advances two main arguments.  First, it contends that rather than thinking of diasporas as 
bounded communities, we should think in terms of diasporic conditions and claims, allowing 
for greater fluidity, contingency, dynamism and heterogeneity in how we approach the study 
and understanding of identity and identity transformation among the Koryo saram. Such 
conditions of hybridity and liminality are evident among individual Koreans living in the city 
of Bishkek. While many Koryo saram continue to claim some form of Korean-ness, this is 
understood, perceived, negotiated – even contested – differently. Second, my findings show a 
growing erosion of two of the three dimensions Brubaker regards as crucial in diasporic 
conditions, namely homeland orientation and boundary maintenance 24 . This is especially 




comparison with older generations. Taken together, the findings shed light on the hitherto 
neglected issue of generational change. 
The article is divided into five sections. In the next section I review some key 
terminological and conceptual issues, and lay out the theoretical framework I apply in this 
article. Next, I ground the experience of Kyrgyzstan’s Koreans in the Soviet period and 
subsequently the post-independence era. In the remainder of the article I discuss the empirics, 
drawing on fieldwork conducted in Kyrgyzstan, before concluding.  
 
 
Terminology: What’s in a name? 
 
Koryo saram 
‘What is in our names?’ asks German Kim, a leading scholar of the post-Soviet Koreans, and 
a Koryo saram himself.25 While the rhetorical question might have well pertained to the actual 
first names (and patronymics) of the Koryo saram, the broader point actually relates to the 
ethnonym too. Historically, in local parlance and official policy, Koreans living in Tsarist 
Russia, the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet republics were called just that: Koreans, (in 
Russian: sing. Корейец/Koreyets/ pl. корейцы/Koreytsi, adjective: Корейский/Koreysky). 
This is how the local ethnic Korean population was classified in the censuses. The English-
language ethnonym does not distinguish between local Koreans and Koreans from elsewhere 
(the peninsula or beyond). In Soviet times the adjective Soviet was added to distinguish them 
abroad. Members of the community, however, prefer to use a different term: Koryo saram 
(고려사람), or people of Koryŏ26. The ethnonym literally means Korean people, and is widely 
accepted among the members of the communities themselves, as well as being used in the 




(고려인/  高麗人) is preferred – literally a Korean individual.27 Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the terminology has simply reverted to Korean for local census purposes or for self-
appellation Koryo saram or, less commonly, Koryoin. The use of the hyphen between 
adjectives/ethnonyms (e.g. Uzbek-Korean or Kyrgyz-Korean) has become increasingly 
common. In this article I adopt the term that Koryo saram prefer to use to refer to themselves, 
and use the simplified spelling of Koryo saram as the transliteration from the Cyrillic alphabet 
into the Latin one (Корё сарам), instead of following McCune-Reischauer rules. To be clear, 
as Saveliev recalls, there were essentially three types of Koreans, depending on patterns and 
timing of settlement on Soviet territory: first, and the largest community among them, were the 
Koryo saram (also known as Soviet Koreans or continental Koreans/материковые корейцы); 
second, the Sakhalin Koreans (Sahallin hanin/사할린 한인 or Сахалинские корейцы in 
Russian), descendants of those that left the southern part of the peninsula in the 1930s and 
1940s, then under Japanese rule, to work on Sakhalin island; and lastly the immigrants from 
the DPRK in the period 1947-49.28  
 
 
From diasporas to diasporic conditions: contesting groupness 
The Diaspora Studies scholarship has broadened its substantive and geographical scope 
in recent decades, reflecting the expansion, arguably the conceptual stretching, of what groups 
the term is supposed to include. As Appadurai notes, the notion of “diaspora denotes the 
transnational movement and ties in with arguments around globalisation and the growth of non-
nation-based solidarities.”29 As such, the concept places a strong emphasis on “contingency 
[and] indeterminacy.” 30  Diaspora “involves a conception of identity that avoids the 




attention on transnational and dynamic processes, relating to ethnic commonalties, which can 
recognise difference and diversity.”31 
Much has changed since the term, which semantically comes from the ancient Greek 
διασπορά (“scattering of seeds”), was first applied to the Jewish dispersal, and later the 
Armenian one. Because the term now tends to share meaning with cognate groups, such as 
immigrants, refugees, guest workers and ethnic communities,32 the world has truly witnessed 
a proliferation of diasporas.33 A key problem arising from the increasingly loose use of the 
term is what Brubaker calls its “dispersion [...] in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary 
space.”34 The conceptual over-stretching implies that if everything, all sort of communities 
more or less dispersed, become diaspora, then nothing is distinctively so. The term therefore 
loses its discriminating power, making it impossible to distinguish diasporic from non-
diasporic communities, (im)migrants in primis.  
At the risk of simplification, conceptualizations of diasporas can be divided into two 
approaches.35 On the one hand are those that think of diasporas in a more classical sense, as 
communities or “bounded entities.”36 The classical definition of diaspora comes from the 
work of William Safran; a community can be referred to as diaspora if it presents the 
following six features: a history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in 
the host country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective 
identity defined by this relationship.37 This approach is relevant to the post-Soviet context. 
Predominant approaches to identity and nation-building across the post-Soviet space have 
been informed by Stalin’s infamous definition of the nation, which was heavily materialist, 
essentialist and primordialist. A nation was defined as “a historically constituted, stable 
community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, 
and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.” 38 The Soviet emphasis on 




ethnic minorities and diasporas, including the Koryo saram, were understood, namely as 
bounded groups. At a first glance there appear to be good reasons for this. The Koryo saram 
are a small non-indigenous population in Central Asia, whose presence in the region dates 
back to less than a century ago. They surely have a long history of dispersal that is tragic in 
origin, which is typical of the other two arch-typical diasporas, the Jewish and the Armenian 
ones. Forcible resettlement and mobility restrictions fostered alienation in the host territories 
(Central Asia), at least until they were allowed to move, urbanize and ultimately Russify and 
assimilate into local societies. The memory of the deportation has strongly shaped the 
community’s collective identity. There were of course problems with the fit between the 
definition and the Korean case, in that the relationship with the “homeland” has remained 
problematic. What is the Koryo saram’s homeland? The Korean peninsula, as in the Soviet 
tradition all ethnonational groups were supposed to have a ‘historical homeland’ 
(istoricheskaya rodina)? Or rather the Russian Far East, where Koreans had settled in the late 
19th century and from where they were deported? And if they were ever to return, where 
would they go? Furthermore, there is an evident problem arising from the application of such 
an essentialist approach to the Koryo saram: its homeland-centredness. As Clifford also 
argues,  homeland-centrism, and the links – material or symbolic – between the homeland and 
the diaspora, are not relevant to many communities that experience a diasporic condition. 
This is because, he continues, a diasporic condition arises from the “… experience of being 
from one place and of another” is linked  “[…]with the idea of particular sentiments towards 
the homeland, whilst being formed by those of the place of settlement.” 39 Such an approach 
allows for what are now called hyphenated identities, highlighting a community’s attachment 
to more than one place.  
Anti-essentialist approaches to diasporas, informed by constructivist and more critical 




the focus from what diasporas are, or are supposed to be, to what they actually do, or is done 
in their name; from being (a diaspora) to claiming (to be one). In this respect, a useful way of 
thinking about this phenomenon is less in terms of diasporas per se, and more as diasporic 
conditions and diasporism. The diasporic condition is therefore “one where one is constructed 
in and through difference, and yet is one that produces differential forms of cultural 
accommodation or syncretism: in some versions, hybridity.” 40  Helpfully, Brubaker has 
unpacked the notion of diasporas and other groups by questioning the notions of groupness, 
groupism and thus their bounded nature.41 This approach does not render the term or its usage 
irrelevant, but shifts attention to the political consequences of the articulation of an identity as 
diasporic. Who diasporizes whom to what ends, and with what results? Diasporas matter 
because of what they do or what is done in their name, rather than because of what they 
(allegedly) are.  
Such an approach appears preferable for two reasons. The first is because of the 
consequences of the multiple experiences of dispersals and mobility among several generations 
of Koryo saram, which forced adaptation to new multi-ethnic contexts. Renegotiation with 
such environments calls for a new understanding of what home and homeland mean. The 
second is because Soviet – and still post-Soviet to a large extent – nation-building has been 
largely a top-down elite-driven affair. The Koryo saram are not an exception, with intellectuals, 
leaders of the ethnic cultural centres and ethnic entrepreneurs engaged in defining what makes 
someone a Koryo saram. 
In his review of the core features of diasporic conditions, Brubaker contends that three 
dimensions remain constitutive:42  the experience of dispersal, forced and non; orientation 
towards a real or imagined homeland which remains the source of loyalty and values; and 
boundary maintenance, that is the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis the host society. 




experience. Originally, diasporas were communities that emerged out of a forced dispersion. 
While dispersion and the memory thereof still remain central to diasporic identities, two new 
aspects have enriched the debate. One is the fact that dispersal may not necessarily have a 
traumatic or even forced origin, and the other is that – as a result of the reconfiguration political 
spaces in post-communist Eurasia – dispersion may not only be the result of the movement of 
peoples across borders, but also the consequence of the movement of borders across settlements. 
The Russian-speaking communities in the former Soviet space is a clear illustration of this new 
type of mobility.  
The second reason for preferring an anti-essentialist approach to diasporas is that the 
very relationship with the homeland has started to be called into question. Homeland 
orientation (in terms of the memory of the dispersion or the commitment to return) dominated 
classical definitions of diasporas. Homeland remained the ultimate source of identity. 
Diasporas were homeland-centered communities. Especially on the wave of contributions 
coming from post-modernism, the salience of homeland orientation has been replaced by an 
approach that critiques the teleology of return, thus de-centering diasporas43. 
In addition to the above, according to Brubaker, there is “a tension in the literature 
between boundary-maintenance and boundary-erosion.”44 While more classical approaches 
have emphasised how diaspora members have struggled to preserve and emphasise the  
boundaries between in-group and out-group, post-modern approaches such as those of Clifford 
and Anthias have emphasized the notions of hybridity, expressed through hyphenized 
ethnonyms (e.g. Korean-American, Kyrgyz-Russian, Korean-Chinese etc.) and inbetween-ness 
or liminality. This is especially relevant to the Korean context as it explicitly recognizes, and 
values, heterogeneity and diversity over essence and coherence.  
Beyond his focus on diasporas, Brubaker has insightfully questioned notions of groups 




with is a tendency, in academia as much as beyond, to take discrete, sharply differentiated, 
internally homogenous and externally bounded groups as “basic constituents of social life, 
fundamental units of social analysis.”46 The problematization of groupness evokes 47 the notion 
of Bourdieu’s performative character, whereby “by invoking groups, they seek to evoke them, 
summon them, call them into being.”48  What follows, therefore, is that we tend to “treat 
groupness as variable and contingent rather than fixed and given.” 49  Quite the contrary, 
groupness, according to Brubaker, should be treated “as an event, as something that happens.”50 
In ultimate analysis, groupness may or may not happen.51 
In light of the above, asking whether the Korean diaspora forms a “single transnational 
community” or whether the Koryo saram have evolved into a “separate Korean nation” is, it 
seems to me, immaterial. While the Koryo saram may have constituted a more homogenous 
and bounded community when they settled in the Russian Far East from the 1860s onwards, 
the farmers and peasants that migrated at the beginning were soon joined by political dissidents 
in the early 20th century,52 divergent socio-spatial geographies have led to the emergence of 
different smaller Koryo saram communities. Rather than privileging the point of origin or the 
relationship with it “the diaspora experience [...] is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the 
recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a concept of ‘identity’ which lives 
with and through, not despite difference; by hybridity.” 53 
 
 
Context: the Soviet and post-Soviet Koreans 
 
Whether as individuals or entire households, Koreans moved from the northern part of the 
Korean peninsula and Manchuria to the Russian Far East from 1863 onwards. Migration to the 




to flee abuse by landowners, moneylenders, drought in 1863 and famine in 1869-1870.54 The 
prospect of land grants, economic subsidies and even the acquisition of Russian citizenship 
attracted growing numbers of Koreans to the territories of Primor’e and Priamur’e.55 Some 
villages, like Pos’et, were 95% Korean, with printed weekly newspapers, schools, technical 
colleges and hospitals. Others in the Vladivostok okrug, like Khankai, Grodekov, Pokrov, 
Shkotovo, Suchan also had substantial Korean populations.56 The first three decades saw a 
surge in the Korean presence in the Russian/Soviet Far East. From over 50,000 people in 1910 
(100 villages), numbers had almost doubled by 1925 (90,000), 170,000 in 1927 and between 
1923 and 1936 there was an average increase of 17% per year.57 By 1935 about 200,000 
Koreans were living in the Russian Far East. However, by 1931 Korean immigration to the 
Soviet Union had virtually ceased. Geopolitics played a large part in this. The opening decades 
of the early 20th century saw an oscillation between welcoming and more hostile policies from 
Tsarist Russia first and later the Soviet Union, mostly dictated by Russian/Soviet-Japanese 
relations. Russia’s strategic concerns over a growing Japanese presence and influence in the 
Far East raised the question of the allegiance of the Korean population of the border regions. 
Tsarist Russia had already begun relocating Koreans that had settled in the Far Eastern regions 
after 1884 outside the border regions.58   
The single most important event in the Soviet history of the Korean population was 
the 1937 deportation (deportatsiya/pereselenie). Resolution 1428-326cc of the Soviet 
People’s Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted on 21 
August 1937,59 subsequently reinforced by Resolution 1647-377cc passed on 28 September 
of the same year,60 led to the near-complete wiping out of the Korean presence in the Far 
Eastern provinces.61 Over the space of two months (September and October) Koreans were 
all placed on trains and deported to Soviet Central Asia, mostly – though not exclusively - in 




Soviet Socialist Republic (Uzbek SSR). Recipient of the new inflow of Koreans were the 
oblasts (provinces) of Tashkent, Kyzyl-orda, Almaty, and the Russian SFSR provinces of 
Astrakhan and Stalingrad.62 As the Great Purge or Great Terror (also known as 
Ezhovshchina, or Era of Ezhov, from the name of the head of the NKVD, Nikolai Ezhov) got 
under way between 1936 and 1938, this was the first full-blown deportation of entire peoples 
in the Soviet Union, although there were smaller-scale precedents63 in 1930/31, 1935, and 
that of the Buryats in 1936.64 There were earlier, aborted, attempts at relocating Koreans 
away from border regions, dating back to 1926 and 1928 but decisions to that effect were not 
implemented, with plans effectively abandoned in 1931.65 Formally, Koreans were not 
accused of any crime, and thus were not bundled alongside other ‘punished peoples’ 
(nakazannye narody), unlike the Germans, Chechens, Volga Tatars and others.66 The nature 
of the deportation was pre-emptive, as – the Soviet argument went – the local Korean 
population might have become involved in espionage in favour of the Japanese, but were not 
accused of any crime.67  Thus, initially, the legal status of the deported Koreans was that of 
“internal exiles” (ssylka/poselentsy). They were confined to the Central Asian countryside 
(with some exceptions),68 where they were tied to the land and worked in local (Korean) 
collective farms, primarily cultivating rice. The procedures accompanying their deportation, 
as laid out in Resolution 1428-326ss also made it clear that they were entitled to take 
property with them during resettlement, claim compensation for the valuables and property 
left in the Far East; the document also refers to the fact that proper arrangements and 
assistance would be set in place on arrival.69 Uniquely in the experience of the Soviet 
deported peoples, those Koreans willing to leave the Soviet Union were to be allowed to do 
so, as long as they were not working in the secret police themselves.70 Reality turned out to 
be much harsher than what appeared on paper and the deportation, as Pohl notes, “greatly 




Central Asia some Koreans did nevertheless move, leaving the Kazakh SSR for the Uzbek 
SSR, either for family re-union or because of the milder climate there72. In practice there 
were both differences between the administrative exile category and the special settlement 
regime, and some areas of overlap. Similarly to the nations deported later, Koreans suffered 
from legal restrictions as to the place of residence, but were not placed in special camps. 
They could not live the Central Asian SSRs where they had been resettled and nor were they 
allowed to live in border districts there. They were also subject to surveillance by the NKDV 
to which they had to report regularly. The deported Koreans were also barred from serving in 
the army; rather they were forced to serve in the labour army, constructing industrial plants or 
working on mines. Initially some ethnic institutions were retained, including Korean schools, 
a theatre and the Korean Pedagogical Institute, a newspaper and a publishing house, though 
many of these were later abolished. The situation changed in 1945, when the Council of 
People’s Commissars extended the special settlement regime to the deported Koreans 
(Decision n. 35, 8 January 1945). In an order dated 2 July 1945 Beria recategorized Koreans 
as special settlers (spets-pereselentsy).73 They were not allowed to leave the region and not 
issued new passports without the five-year limit to exile. They were prevented from studying 
science of other technical subject at universities and lost many of their ethnic institutions. 
Following the death of Stalin in 1953 and de-Stalinization under Khrushchev (1953-1962), 
such restrictions were gradually lifted from 1954 onwards .74 This led to a steady 
urbanization and Russification of the Soviet Koreans, particularly from 1970 onwards, as 
evidenced by the Koreans’ linguistic Russification shown in subsequent Soviet censuses.75 A 
minority chose to return to the Far East. Official rehabilitation, however, only much later, 
with the USSR’S supreme Soviet recognising that eleven of the thirteen ethnic groups 




and the Law on Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples only signed by  then Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin and approved by the Russian Parliament in April 1991.77 
 
Nation-building and nationality policies under Soviet rule 
The Soviet Union was administratively structured, formally, as a federal state. Crucial to its 
organization was the link between ethnicity and territory, whereby each ethno-national 
community was expected to be endowed with its own territory. There was a hierarchy of 
administrative units with Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) with the Russian, Kazakh, Uzbek, 
Ukrainian ones at the top of this hierarchy endowed with relatively higher (though still limited, 
in practical terms) levels of autonomy, descending all the way down to autonomous republics 
(e.g. the Karakalpak ASSR within the Uzbek SSR), autonomous regions (the Gorno-
Badakhshan autonomous region in the Tajik SSR), autonomous territories, and districts. While 
officially countering nationalism as a reactionary and backward phenomenon, the Soviet 
authorities crystallised and even promoted nationality (natsional’nost’, built on ethnicity at its 
core) as a central category to classify and count people (its citizens).78 The ultimate aim was 
for a supra-national Soviet people (sovetsky narod/sovetsky chelovek), a non-national category 
to supersede national divisions. This meant that, for example, as James Critchlow aptly put it 
in reference to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, Uzbek children would go to Uzbek schools 
where they were taught in Uzbek language, would later read Uzbek-language newspapers and 
listen to radio programmes in Uzbek.79  The Uzbek SSR had its own institutions, besides 
schools, including theatres, parliament, a flag and a constitution. All Soviet citizens were 
reminded, from an early age onwards, of who they were (or who the authorities had decided 
they would be). Ethnic institutions helped foster and maintain a sense of national belonging. 
Ultimately, the relevant entry in one’s own passport (the piataya grafa, or fifth line) 




over nationality issues crucially framed how populations were organized and how their national 
consciousness was, to some degrees, promoted. 80  Francine Hirsch called this a double 
assimilation policy (2000): first of groups into nations and then subsequently into the afore-
mentioned Soviet people. The disintegration of the Soviet state occurred before this process 
was completed.  
What did this all mean for the Soviet Koreans?  As a dispersed population without its 
own national territory on Soviet soil, they had some of these ethnic institutions, but not all. 
Crucially, they were not endowed with a national territory, as Korea (under Japanese rule 1910-
1945 and then the two Koreas) was regarded as their historical homeland(s). Thus, petitions 
for territorial autonomy in the Far Eastern regions of the Russian SFSR was not granted on the 
grounds that an external, historical homeland already existed (“Korea”).81 As such there was 
no cadre policy either since there was no land where Koreans could enjoy a primus inter pares 
status, where they could be regarded as the “titular nation” (titul’naya natsiya) in Soviet 
parlance.  Koreans, and other smaller groups among them, started to be referred to as one of 
the diasporas/ диаспоры, a term that was also used, confusingly, to refer to groups with a 
history of dispersal to settler groups (such as the Russians) or local indigenous communities 
(like the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan). The everyday reality for Soviet Koreans was one of steady 
Russification, in the form of their assimilation into Russian language and culture.  
 
 
Koreans in Soviet Kirgizia and post-independence Kyrgyzstan 
A minuscule Korean presence was first reported in Central Asia already in the 1897 census, 
around Pishpek (today’s Bishkek) and Przhevalsk (now Karakol, in the eastern part of the 
country).82  As table 2 shows, the presence was still negligible in the 1920s (1926 census) and 




independence movement, such as Petr Semenovich Tsoy (чке дзе кен/Chke Dze Khen , 
최재현) arrived in Soviet Kirgizia in the 1920s and 1930s.83 Another 130 Koreans arrived in 
1934-38.84 As the numbers of Koreans in Soviet Kirgizia grew somewhat between the census 
of 1926 and that of 1939, some were left wondering whether Koreans had also been deported 
to this Soviet republic too in 1937, a question raised in Gennady Li’s work.85 According Li, 
there was no plan to deport Koreans to the Kyrgyz SSR, although this did not prevent some 
individuals from being forcibly relocated there. Census data, as observed above, show that 
the Korean population rose from 9 in 1926 to 508 in 1939. In the archival material I 
examined there is no reference to the Kirgiz SSR being the destination of the deportation 
which were listed as the “South Kazakhstan region, the regions of the Aral Sea, Balk86ash 
and the Uzbek SSR”). That said, given that at least initially some Koreans did leave the 
Kazakh SSR southwards it is possible that some ended up in Soviet Kirgizia. Li also 
mentions the presence of some Koreans in Kyzyl-Kiya and Sulyutka in southern Kyrgyzstan 
(oday’s Batken’s province).87 As these areas border Uzbekistan and some Koreans were 
resettled in the Uzbek side of the Ferghana Valley it is also conceivable that they also moved 
voluntarily, especially since in Soviet times the boundaries between Soviet republics (SSRs) 
were administrative only.88 As mobility restrictions were lifted from the mid-1950s onwards 
Koreans could move from the countryside to cities and across SSRs. This led to a more 
noticeable Korean presence being established in the Kyrgyz SSR. Numbers grew over time as 
Koreans abandoned agricultural activities in favour of employment in urban centres. From 
1959 onwards the local Korean population increased further. A more significant migration to 
the Kyrgyz SSR began in the second half of the 1950s.89 The numbers remained fairly stable 
until the 1990s, when in line with broader patterns of post-Soviet migration, many members 
of minority groups left the place where they were living. The number of Koreans in 




From the Soviet experience, Kyrgyzstan “inherited a legacy of complex ethnic 
politics,”90 which included the presence of cross-border minorities and a number of territorial 
oddities such as enclaves (small pockets of land formally under Uzbekistani and Tajikistani 
sovereignty) and exclaves (portions of territory in neighbouring Uzbekistan). Although the 
post-independence authorities have sought to emphasise continuities between post-
independence Kyrgyzstan and  pre-modern Kyrgyz tribal confederations – many of which were 
not really associated with the territory of today’s Kyrgyzstan. Within its current boundaries 
Kyrgyzstan is very much a recent formation; its origins date back to the Soviet period, when 
the national-territorial delimitation of 1924-36  reshaped the political and administrative space 
of the Central Asian region in a way that resembles the way this looks today.91 Initially the 
Kyrgyz entity was set up as an autonomous region within the Russian SFSR and erroneously 
called Kara-Kyrgyz, as the Kazakh ASSR was called Kyrgyz instead. In 1936 the status of the 
region was upgraded to that of a full union republic (SSR), at the same level of the Russian, 
































































































Source: ЦСУ СССР (Центральное статистическое управление при Совете Министров 
Союз Социалистических Социалистических Республик. Всесоюзная перепись населения        
1926 года. Москва.: Издание ЦСУ Союза ССР, 1928-29. ЦСУ СССР (Центральное 
статистическое управление при Совете Министров Союз  
 Социалистических Социалистических Республик. Всесоюзная перепись населения  
 1926 года. Национальный состав населения по регионам республик СССР. 
ЦСУ СССР (Центральное статистическое управление при Совете Министров Союз  
Социалистических Социалистических Республик. Всесоюзная перепись  
населения 1989 года. 
Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР.   
ЦСУ СССР (Центральное статистическое управление при Совете Министров Союз  
 Социалистических Социалистических Республик. Всесоюзная перепись  
населения 1959 года. 
Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР. ЦСУ СССР (Центральное 
статистическое управление при Совете Министров Союз  
     Социалистических Социалистических Республик. Всесоюзная перепись населения  
    1939 года.Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР.  
ЦСУ СССР (Центральное статистическое управление при Совете Министров Союз  
 Социалистических Социалистических Республик. Всесоюзная перепись населения  




(Центральное статистическое управление при Совете Министров Союз  
    Социалистических Социалистических Республик. Всесоюзная перепись населения  
    1979 года.Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР. Национальный 




Table 3. The Koryo saram in Kyrgyzstan (2009; by province/city/administrative division) 
 Total Bishkek Chuy Issyk 
kul 









133 70 1 237 327 47 82 
Source: Национальный статистический комитет Кыргызской Республики. 





As Buttino notes in reference to the Korean population in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, the story of 
the Koryo saram is one of “how a deported minority ingeniously adapted to the new 
environment and was capable of negotiating with the Soviet authorities a respectable position 
in the new society.”92 Since the Soviet collapse, due to a combination of uncertainty over status 
and the possible rise in local ethnic nationalism and – more generally – the social and economic 
hardship that affected all groups in post-independence Kyrgyzstan, some Koreans left, as the 




republics due to its overall more open social, economic and political environment. At just over 
17,000, Koreans represent around 0.2% of the country’s population.  
As I have argued elsewhere, “the story of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan is one of unexpected 
independence and statehood, a fragile – ‘imperilled’ – sovereignty.” 93  From the outset, 
Kyrgyzstan was confronted with several challenges. A market economy had to be created from 
the ashes of the Soviet command economy in a context that was still largely rural and 
agricultural. A common national identity had to be created when the titular group was itself 
divided along tribal and regional lines and had no clear idea as to what kind of approach to 
nation-building it would promote, whether ethnic or civic. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan, like 
its neighbours in the region, was home to a culturally and ethnically plural society. Kyrgyzstan 
emerged from the Soviet experience as an ethnically diverse country, with the titular group – 
the Kyrgyz – demographically constituting a bare majority. Two large minority groups stood 
out, the Russians and the Uzbeks. 94  Askar Akayev, the first president of independent 
Kyrgyzstan (1990-2005) sought to reject the sort of nationalising policies that would have 
elevated the status of the titular group above that of others95, favouring – with some ambiguities 
- a more internationalist approach. The state promoted the notion of “Kyrgyzstan – our 
common home” (Kyrgyzstan: nash obshchii dom), where all groups would feel equally 
welcome and protected. However, over time, a “dual identity narrative”96 during the Akayev 
years gradually gave way to the rise of Kyrgyz nationalism, first under Kurmanbek Bakiev 
(2005-2010) and later on under Almazbek Atambayev (2011-2017).  
What were the implications of post-independence turbulence and nation- and state-
building strategies, and the consequent changes for local Koreans? The Koryo saram were not 
the Kyrgyz nation’s significant other. Initially these were the ethnic Russians, and later the 
Uzbeks, following Russian out-migration, especially in the 1990s, and relative demographic 




in the country and are overwhelmingly concentrated in the northern part of the country (about 
95%), and particularly in the capital city of Bishkek (almost 70%) and the surrounding Chuy 
province (about 25%).  They are a highly urbanised, educated community, and well integrated 
in local societies. As such, politically and demographically, they have posed no threat to the 
titular group. 
Cultural revival started for the local Koreans, as for many ethno-national communities 
in the late Soviet period, in the late 1980s, when cultural centres and associations were 
established for minority groups (somehow controversially they were never set up for majority 
groups, on the assumption that state institutions would somehow promote them). The “Chinson” 
Association for the Koreans of Kyrgyzstan was founded in 1989. Links with South Korea were 
established as the 1990s. As examined elsewhere, 97  Seoul established a wide range of 
educational programmes aimed at the promotion of Korean language and culture, educational 
opportunities including scholarships, grants and exchange programmes. These were not 
explicitly designed to specifically support the Koryo saram, and the whole local population 
was invited to learn more about Korean culture. Language courses proliferated, also fuelled by 
the success of Hallyu (Korean wave), Korean dramas, K-pop, films, food and cosmetic 
products. Korean shops now line many of the streets of Kyrgyzstan’s capital city, Bishkek. 
 
 
Identity transformation among today’s Koryo saram 
 
“Koreans are Korean everywhere; [being Korean] is about blood”, passionately argued 
Gennady Li, a well-known local writer in Bishkek as we met in the ‘Korean House’ (Koreisky 
dom), one of the cultural institutions where the more engaged Koryo saram population gathers 




relocating to Soviet Kirgizia. His remarks were about Koreans, but reflected a broader 
approach to identity promoted during Soviet times (ethnogenesis), essentialist and 
primordialist, which still resonates among some today. Viktoriya, a 65-year old lady active in 
the Society of Koreans of Kyrgyzstan, an organization represented in the Assembly of the 
People of Kyrgyzstan, echoed Li’s comment: “traditions, values, culture, food. All Koreans 
share those; it does not matter what age they are.”99  
This view stood in stark contrast to remarks by young local Koreans, though. “My 
parents tell me I am Korean, my grandparents tell me I am Korean as they recall their tragic 
experiences as children during the deportation from the Far East, but I don’t feel the same. I 
lived in Russia and I feel closer to them [Russians, author’s note]. I also studied and lived in 
America and South Korea. I am full of doubts, I do not know who I am”, says Nataliya, a 19-
year old resident of Bishkek.100 As she recalls her own identity dilemmas and struggles with 
her sense of (multiple) belongings, in fact her in-betweenness, I am reminded of the sheer 
diversity of opinions among the Koryo saram, or the post-Soviet Koreans, and the way in which 
they articulate and express, and negotiate their Korean-ness and senses of us-ness and other-
ness.  The two views above also illustrate how older-generation Koreans are more inclined to 
emphasise diasporic identities as claims and stances, and are aware of their role in this process, 
whilst younger Koreans are more visibly open to notions of hybridity and hyphenated identities, 
or even abrupt identity changes like that of Nataliya, above. Despite such obvious and growing 
differences, both generations have grown up in multi-ethnic societies, the Soviet one and the 
post-Soviet republic which, by and large, continue to be ethnically and culturally diverse 







The memory of the deportation, its direct experience for the older generations and the way its 
narrated and passed on across generations, remains an important dimension of the Koryo 
saram’s diasporic condition, although the extent to which this is a defining moment depends 
on individual experiences and especially the generation. All young Koreans I spoke to in 
Bishkek recalled stories they had been told by their grandparents” “I know the events took 
place a long time ago, but this is still part of who we [Koreans of the former Soviet Union] are 
and what makes us different [from other Koreans]”, says Valeriy, a young undergraduate 
student at a local international university101. 
At the same time, with the more elderly members of the older generations dying and 
new waves of international mobility, from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan, from Kyrgyzstan to 
Russia or South Korea or the United States intensifying, it is likely that this memory will 
gradually fade away, like other aspects of Koryo saram-ness that have long become extinct, 
such as language (Koryo mar). “Language represents the most important element of a culture, 
element of self-identification” writes Li,102 and yet, Koreans in post-Soviet Eurasia have felt 





If ties with the homeland, a sense of longing and belonging, the need to either restore or return 
to it were key element of traditional diasporic identities, these are clearly not applicable to the 
case of Bishkek’s Koreans. How Koryo saram relate to the notion of homeland is, by contrast, 
blurred and contested. “My home is where I was born” local Koreans all seem to concur. The 
strongest parallel between the younger and older generations is an attachment to territory, 




(nasha Rodina) is Kyrgyzstan; we are Kyrgyzstani”, an expression reminiscent of his 
publications (My Kyrgyzstantsy, we are Kyrgyzstanis).103 The interesting aspect of this is that 
Li had lived in other Soviet republics, having been born in the Uzbek SSR before going to 
university in Moscow, and only subsequently settling in the Kirgiz SSR. At the same time, he 
also felt it necessary to add a note clarifying that “Korea is our (the Koreans’) historical 
homeland, this is where we come from.”104 Viktoriya, who as a retiree volunteers at the Korean 
national cultural centre, an institution affiliated with the Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan 
(Assemblayea Naroda Kyrgyzstana, created by former President Akaev in 1997, to give 
institutional representation to the country’s ethnic minority groups), agreed on an unspecified 
and imagined Korea (North? South? Chosŏn?) being the ultimate homeland. In reality, whilst 
for historical diasporas the relationship with the homeland is crucial, alongside a myth of return, 
this appears to be an increasingly less relevant aspect of the identity and self-perceptions of the 
local Korean youth. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, local Koreans have 
experienced a dual wave of de- and re-territorialization of their identities, well noted both in 
the literature on the Koryo saram 105  and Koreans abroad more generally. 106  Initially, the 
opening of previously sealed boundaries and a discovery of links with South Korea led to 
greater enthusiasm for the country. Over time, however, the different historical experiences 
and cultural products available to Koreans from the peninsula and the Koryo saram meant that 
a phase of disenchantment followed.107 Although this point holds true across generations, 
younger Koryo saram expressed a sense of ‘confusion’ and ‘disorientation’ in relation to the 
place they consider as homeland. Some, like the younger Viktoriya, confess changing their 
‘homeland orientation’ depending on where she lived. 108  As she has lived in Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan and the United States, she admitted being confused and not knowing where she 
belongs or which place, if any, she would consider as her home(land). Viktor, by contrast, 




cultures and traditions between the local Koreans and the other local communities, whereas 
whenever he visited South Korea he felt a remarkable cultural distance, also of values: 
“Kyrgyzstan is more traditional, Koreans in South Korea are different from us. I feel a foreigner 
there.” 109  Nataliya felt evenly split between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, a country she felt 
culturally closer to than Kyrgyzstan due to her being a Russian-speaker without advanced 
knowledge of the Kyrgyz language. 110  While more systematic assessment of identity 
perceptions among local Koreans are needed, this exploratory overview of self-perceptions 
among local Koryo saram youth suggests that attachments to Korea and a perception that this 
is a historical homeland are visibly decreasing over time. The local Korean youth is much more 
open to acknowledging multiple loyalties, attachments and affiliations, without these being 





The Koreans of Kyrgyzstan are more prone to embrace multiple identities, as both Koreans 
and Kyrgyz, Russian, or Uzbek, contextualizing the perception of Korean-ness in a very 
personal, yet malleable way. Hybridity, in other terms, is something that perhaps, over 
generations of survival in and adaptation to evolving multi-cultural environments, has come to 
accompany the Koryo saram. Often regarded as key identity markers, language and religion do 
not serve the purpose of maintaining the boundaries between the local Koreans and their 
“others.” Koryo mar is virtually an extinct language, only spoken – not written – by an 
increasingly small number of elderly Koreans. 111  As a result of their assimilation and 
integration into Russian/Soviet society, Russian was, and is the main language of choice of 




Central Asian region as a result of South Korea’s cultural diplomacy and educational exchange, 
promoted by the Korea Foundation and the Academy of Korean Studies, among others. Interest 
in Korean culture, including language, is increasing especially among the local youth, but this 
has more to do with pop culture than shared cultural references with young South Koreans. 
Religion is no more of a glue: Koreans profess various confessions of Christianity or no faith, 
and despite the growing presence and influence of Korean missionary groups, this has not 
translated into visible mass conversions, although data on religious affiliation among Koryo 
saram are more scarce compared to those on language knowledge.  
Overall, the cultural referents seem to be different from those of South Koreans, but also of 
older generations of local Koreans. In Soviet times ethnic institutions had the important role 
of preserving, promoting or reviving national culture, in whatever way this might have been 
defined. Crucially, tuition in a group’s language, media, schools, theatres, and other aspects 
crucial to group identity, served the purpose of reinforcing both the members’ identity and 
sense of belonging and accentuating their difference (boundaries) from outsiders.  Yet, if 
there was a common thread in my interviews with young local Koreans, it was their difficulty 
to relate to those very Soviet-era institutions such as the Korean national-cultural centre 
(OKK, Ob’edinienie Koreytsev Kyrgyzstana). Apart from a generational issue (they felt that 
the ethnic associations were just “a place for people of a certain age”112 what they could not 
relate to was the emphasis on “traditional” dresses, food or culture more generally. Not that 
these were not of interest, and many young Koreans recalled celebrating Korean traditional 
holidays such as ch'usŏk  at home, but they seemingly struggled with cultural performances 
where all ethnic minorities were routinely asked to express and celebrate “their national 
culture.” This assumption of “one-ness” rendered the generational gap particularly acute, 
raising the questions of whether old and new understandings of Korean-ness had much in 




groups have been progressively eroded. This is due to the combined influence of their gradual 
Russification, which resulted in their assimilation in the broader Russian or Russian-speaking 




In lieu of conclusion: ex uno plures? 
 
Over decades in Soviet and post-Soviet times, the lives and identities of the Koryo saram have 
been shaped by different and divergent socio-spatial geographies. The Soviet Union was a 
multi-national environment they gradually got used to and integrated in, while experiencing 
distinctive aspects of Soviet life in their different socio-cultural milieu. The disintegration of 
the Soviet state and the emergence of fifteen successor states rendered such differences among 
Koreans even more apparent and acute.  
While most of the Koryo saram scholarship has focused on the differences between 
them and “other” Koreans, typically from the peninsula, in this article I have focused on the 
emerging differences among the Koryo saram of the same locale themselves. The Koryo saram 
of Bishkek (and the surrounding areas) have experienced upheaval and forced adaptation for 
generations as a result of multiple experiences of mobility. Due to the limited scope of this 
study, the findings are tentative and could be subject to more systematic probing in future 
research , for example through either large scale surveys or thorough ethnographic 
investigations.  
Although the memory of the deportation remains an important feature of the diasporic 
condition, local Koreans relate very differently to the other two dimensions identified by 




with the homeland – alongside very different understanding of what the homeland is – has 
progressively diminished. Similarly, rather than seeking to preserve their boundaries with the 
surrounding cultural milieu, the Koryo saram have, through assimilation, seen those boundaries 
erode. This is especially evidence among Koreans of about twenty and thirty years of age. 
Findings suggest a clear tendency among the young Koryo saram to hyphenize their identities, 
as Korean-Kyrgyz, Korean-Uzbek, Russian Korean or else. The broad tendency towards re-
territorialization of diasporic identities is something that other scholars have noted in relation 
to, for example, the Koreans of New Malden in London or Kazakhstan’s Koreans.114 The 
Koryo saram perceive, articulate and negotiate their Korean-ness differently in a way that is 
reminiscent of Stuart Hall’s notion of “identity through difference.”115 As such they can be 
understood as liminal diasporic communities, where their primary affiliations are constantly in 
flux, subject to change, contestation and re-negotiation. To conclude, the question thus is not 
whether the Koryo saram are or are not (still) Korean. Shaped by increasingly distinctive 
historical geographies, the Koryo saram tell a story of contingency, survival, adaptation and – 
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